Numerical possibility measures can be interpreted as systems of upper betting rates for events. As such, they have a special part in the unifying behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities, proposed by Walley. On this interpretation, they should arguably satisfy certain rationality, or consistency, requirements, such as avoiding sure loss and coherence. Using a version of Walley's notion of epistemic independence suitable for possibility measures, we study in detail what these rationality requirements tell us about the construction of independent product possibility measures from given marginals, and we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for a product to satisfy these criteria. In particular, we show that the well-known minimum and product rules for forming independent joint distributions from marginal ones, are only coherent when at least one of these distributions assume just the values zero and one.
have also been studied under different names and guises, and in other contexts, see for instance [1, 9, 10, 13, 14] .
In recent years, quite some effort has been invested in the study of possibility measures in the framework of the theory of imprecise probabilities [15] . In this approach, the possibility of some event is given the behavioural interpretation of a subject's upper probability, or upper betting rate, for the event, i.e., the infimum rate at which the subject is willing to take bets on the event, or equivalently, one minus the supremum rate at which he is willing to bet against it. A possibility measure then represents a collection of such upper betting rates. Because specifying an upper betting rate amounts to a commitment to act (bet) in certain ways, upper probabilities and in particular possibility measures are subject to a number of rationality, or consistency, requirements, called avoiding sure loss and coherence. It turns out that normal possibility measures satisfy these requirements, and can therefore be considered as reasonable imprecise probability models [3, 4, 5, 16] . So can (precise) probability measures. This points to a distinct advantage of the unifying approach using the theory of imprecise probabilities: it allows the comparison of both types of measures in a single framework, using a common language and the same (behavioural) interpretation. This has for instance been done in a recent study [18] , where it is argued that possibility measures indeed seem to be better suited for modelling linguistic uncertainty than probability measures.
This being said, it is by no means obvious that all of what is commonly understood as 'possibility theory' will get similar backing from the theory of imprecise probabilities: the rationality criteria of avoiding sure loss and coherence can for instance be used to weed out those notions and techniques which are inconsistent with the behavioural interpretation of possibility measures as upper probabilities. To give an example, in contradistinction to probability theory, a large variety of rules have been proposed for conditioning a possibility measure (see for instance the overviews in [2, 7, 17] ). In a recent paper [17] , Walley and De Cooman have shown that most of these rules avoid sure loss, but do not satisfy the stricter requirement of coherence. They have also suggested a number of new conditioning rules that guarantee coherence.
Two variables are said to be epistemically independent to a subject when new knowledge about the value that one variable assumes, does not change his beliefs about the value the other variable takes [15, Chapter 9] . In the present paper, we study some aspects of this notion of independence for possibility measures. More specifically, we investigate what the rationality criteria of avoiding sure loss and coherence tell us about the construction of independent joint possibility measures from given marginal ones.
We have organised the paper as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review definitions and basic results concerning the interpretation of possibility measures as upper betting rates, necessary for understanding much of what follows. In Section 3, we formulate a definition of epistemic independence inspired by Walley's original definition [15] , and suitable in a 'possibilistic' context. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition, in terms of sets of dominated probability measures, for the consistency of a joint possibility measure with its marginals, under the epistemic independence assumption.
This condition is quite complicated, but we show in Section 4 that it can be simplified significantly when one of the marginal possibility measures is unimodal: we obtain a characterisation of the coherent product possibility measures through an upper bound.
The study for the plurimodal case seems to be much harder, and we present a simplified sufficient, and a different necessary, condition for coherence under the epistemic independence assumption in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with additional discussion. This paper is an updated and expanded version of a paper [11] presented at ISIPTA '01, the Second International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications.
Preliminary notions and results
A possibility measure Π on a finite 1 set Ω is a map defined on the power set ℘(Ω) of Possibility measures can be incorporated into the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities [15] by interpreting them as upper probabilities: for any event A ⊆ Ω, Π(A) is then a subject's upper probability of A, i.e., his infimum acceptable rate for taking bets on A, or one minus his supremum acceptable rate for betting against A. 1 We only deal with possibility measures on finite sets in this paper.
This means that the subject is disposed to accept a bet whose outcome is x − 1 if A occurs, and x if A doesn't occur, for all x > Π(A). It turns out [3, 4, 16] We only consider the interesting case that both X and Y have more than one element.
We assume that a subject has certain beliefs about which values these variables assume,
and that he models these beliefs using a possibility measure Π X,Y on X × Y, with
is the subject's upper probability for the event that (X, Y ) assumes a value in C, and for (x, y) ∈ X × Y, π X,Y (x, y) is his upper probability that (X, Y ) assumes the value (x, y).
The marginals Π X and Π Y of the so-called joint possibility measure Π X,Y are defined as follows.
It is a possibility measure on X , and Π X (A) represents the subject's upper probability that the variable Conditional possibility measures [2, 3, 6, 7] can be given the behavioural interpretation of updated upper probabilities [3, 17] . Π X|Y (A|y) is then interpreted as the subject's infimum acceptable rate for taking bets on, or one minus his supremum rate for betting against, the event that X assumes a value in A ⊆ X , after learning only that Y takes the value y ∈ Y; and similarly for
is assumed to be a possibility measure on Y, with distribution π Y |X (·|x); and for each y ∈ Y, Π X|Y (·|y) is assumed to be a possibility measure on X , with distribution π X|Y (·|y). 2 We assume that the reader is familiar with these basic consistency requirements in the theory of imprecise probabilities. See [3, 4, 15, 16] for more details. 3 A specific and interesting case where this assumption makes sense, is discussed in [18] . 4 We only consider the case that the subject's conditional upper probabilities are possibility measures as
Since on a behavioural interpretation, the joint and the conditional possibility measures represent a subject's dispositions to act in certain ways, they should satisfy certain rationality requirements, not only separately (they should all be normal!) but also taken together. A thorough discussion of such criteria in the general context of imprecise probabilities was given by Walley [15] . The special case of possibility measures was discussed by Walley and De Cooman [17] , who also investigated which of a large number of so-called conditioning rules for possibility measures, available in the literature, satisfy these criteria. We refer to their work for both motivation and mathematical development.
For the purposes of the present paper, it will suffice to recall the following characterisation of the criteria of avoiding sure loss and of coherence of the joint and conditional possibility distributions (or equivalently, measures) in terms of sets of dominated probability measures. It can be easily inferred from Lemma 3 and the proof of Theorem 1 in [17] . Let M c be the set of probability measures defined on the power set of X × Y and satisfying the following inequalities:
for all B ⊆ X and y ∈ Y such that P (X × {y}) > 0; and 
all B ⊆ X and y ∈ Y, with equality when
all C ⊆ Y and x ∈ X , with equality when η(x) = max{π X (u) : u = x} < 1.
well. This is perfectly compatible with the epistemic independence assumption to be introduced and studied later.
If there is such a set M, then M c is the largest such set.
A few remarks are in order here. Strictly speaking, this theorem gives a characterisation of the rationality conditions of avoiding uniform sure loss, and of weak coherence, respectively. Walley [15, Section 7.1] also discusses the generally more stringent rationality conditions of avoiding partial loss and (strong) coherence. But we have shown elsewhere [12] that, for general upper probabilities, under the conditions of epistemic independence to be discussed further on, the weak and strong coherence of joint and marginal upper probabilities in fact turn out to be equivalent, and that the same holds for avoiding partial loss and avoiding uniform sure loss. For these reasons, we have restricted ourselves here to the characterisation of the weaker notions: this turns out to be sufficient, but it is a lot easier to do. In order not to burden our terminology too much, we shall simply refer to them as 'avoiding sure loss' and 'coherence'.
There is a simple necessary condition for the coherence of π X,Y , {π Y |X (·|x) : x ∈ X } and {π X|Y (·|y) : y ∈ Y}, which was shown in [17] to be the following:
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, where 0 0 is taken to be 0. As mentioned in [17] , the inequality (1) is a special case of a condition valid in general for upper probabilities. It will play a central part in what follows.
Epistemic independence and coherence
We are now ready to address the question that will occupy us in the rest of the paper.
Assume that our subject has beliefs (or information) about the values assumed by the variables X and Y separately, and that he has modelled his beliefs in the form of the marginal possibility distributions π X and π Y . He also judges the variables X and Y to be epistemically 5 independent: he judges that new information about the value of one variable will not affect his beliefs about the value the other variable assumes. We
intend to investigate what this independence assumption, together with the rationality requirements of avoiding sure loss and coherence, tells us about the joint distribution π X,Y , which models the subject's beliefs about the values X and Y assume jointly.
For probability measures (on finite spaces), the judgement of epistemic independence together with coherence leads uniquely to the product probability measure of the marginals [15, Section 9.3.2]. We shall see that there is no uniqueness in the case of possibility measures: for given marginals, there is generally more than one joint possibility distribution that satisfies the independence and coherence requirements. Our aim is to characterise such joint distributions in a manner that is as simple as possible.
The first step we have to take is to apply the notion of epistemic independence, formulated by Walley for general imprecise models [15, Section 9] to the case that beliefs are represented by possibility distributions.
Definition 1.
We say that Y is irrelevant to X when π X|Y (x|y) = π X (x) for all
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. We say that X and Y are epistemically independent when X is irrelevant to Y and Y is irrelevant to X.
Given the marginal distributions π X and π Y , the judgement of epistemic independence leads at once to values for the conditional distributions {π X|Y (·|y) : y ∈ Y} and {π Y |X (·|x) : x ∈ X }. We now only have to require that the joint π X,Y (which has marginals π X and π Y ) should be consistent with these conditional distributions.
Definition 2.
We say that the normal joint possibility distribution π X,Y avoids sure loss under epistemic independence when the joint distribution and the conditional possibility distributions {π Y |X (·|x) : x ∈ X } and {π X|Y (·|y) : y ∈ Y} given by
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, avoid sure loss. Similarly, we say that the joint distribution π X,Y is coherent under epistemic independence when these possibility distributions are coherent. In that case, π X,Y will be called an independent joint distribution, or an independent product of its marginals π X and π Y .
It turns out that the first consistency condition under epistemic independence is always satisfied. The second condition is more involved, however. To see this, consider the set M i (the counterpart of the set M c in the previous section) of probability measures defined on the power set of X × Y and satisfying the following inequalities:
for all B ⊆ X and y ∈ Y such that P (X × {y}) > 0; and
Applying Theorem 1 leads to the following result, which is the starting point for the further development. 
B ⊆ X and y ∈ Y, with equality when β(y) < 1.
C ⊆ Y and x ∈ X , with equality when η(x) < 1.
If there is such a set M, then M i is the greatest such set.
Proof. The coherence part follows immediately from Theorem 1. The same theorem tells us that π X,Y avoids sure loss under epistemic independence if and only if M i = ∅.
It therefore only remains to show that M i = ∅. Consider (x, y) ∈ X × Y such that π X,Y (x, y) = 1, and consequently π X (x) = π Y (y) = 1 (there always are such x and y, since π X,Y is normal). Define the (degenerate) probability measure P on the power set of X × Y by P (x, y) = 1. Then it is easy to see that P ∈ M i .
We can also take a look at the necessary condition for coherence (1) , mentioned in the previous section. Using the epistemic independence relation (2), we find:
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, where 0 0 is taken to be 0. This is a very simple necessary condition for the coherence under epistemic independence of π X,Y , expressed only in terms of the local values π X,Y (x, y), π X (x) and π Y (y) of the joint distribution and its marginals. We can easily deduce from this condition certain properties that will be used repeatedly further on.
Lemma 3.
If the normal joint distribution π X,Y satisfies the necessary condition (NC), then for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y:
Proof. The proof of the fourth statement is similar to that of the first, and the second statement follows immediately from the first. We therefore concentrate on proving the first and third statements. We may assume without loss of generality that
and consequently
To prove the third statement, observe that we may assume that π X (x) > 0. Then there is some y in Y such that π X,Y (x, y) = π X (x), and the second statement tells us that
In the rest of this section, we investigate how the necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem 2 can be simplified. Our efforts will culminate in Theorem 8, which is the most important stepping stone for our investigation in the following sections. First of all, in checking the coherence condition, the following lemma will be very useful, because it helps us verify whether a probability measure belongs to M i or not. The proof is elementary, and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.
Let m be the number of elements in X , and n the number of elements in Y.
Consider a probability measure P defined on the power set of X × Y.
1. Assume that the mn elements z = (x, y) of X × Y are labeled in such a way that
if and only if P (z 1 ) + · · · + P (z j ) ≤ π X,Y (z j ) for j = 1, . . . , nm.
Assume that the m elements of X are labeled in such a way that
π X (x 1 ) ≤ π X (x 2 ) ≤ · · · ≤ π X (x m ). Then P satisfies condition (CI 2 ) if
and only if for all
y ∈ Y such that P (X × {y}) > 0 and for j = 1, . . . , m,
Assume that the n elements of Y are labeled in such a way that
. Then P satisfies condition (CI 3 ) if and only if for all x ∈ X such that P ({x} × Y) > 0 and for j = 1, . . . , n,
Interestingly, coherence under independence is not influenced by removing from the set X elements x such that π X (x) = 0 and from the set Y elements y such that π Y (y) = 0. This implies that our results will remain valid if, instead of using condition (2) to define epistemic independence, we use the alternative condition:
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, which is sometimes found in the literature (see for instance [8] ).
Proposition 6. The set of probabilities M i satisfies the first condition of Theorem 2 if and only if for all
Proof. We first show that the condition is sufficient. Indeed, for any A ⊆ X × Y,
, and the condition tells us moreover that there is some P ∈ M i such that
show that the condition is necessary. Consider (x, y) ∈ X × Y. If M i satisfies the first condition of Theorem 2, then π X,Y (x, y) = sup{P (x, y) : P ∈ M i }. Since M i is obviously closed in the natural topology 8 , this supremum is actually achieved for some P ∈ M i , or in other words, there is some P ∈ M i such that P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y).
Proposition 7. If the normal joint distribution π X,Y satisfies the necessary condition (NC), then the set M i always satisfies the second and third conditions of Theorem 2.
Proof. We show that M i satisfies the second condition. The proof for the third condition is completely similar (or symmetrical). It follows from (CI 2 ) that we only need to prove that for all B ⊆ X :
when β(y) < 1. Let us suppose, therefore, that β(y o ) < 1, or in other words that π Y is unimodal with unique mode y o . Consider B ⊆ X . Then there is some x B ∈ B such that Π X (B) = π X (x B ). If Π X (B) = 1, it follows from Lemma 3 and the unimodality of π Y that 1 = π X (x B ) = π X,Y (x B , y o ). The probability P uniquely defined on the power set of X × Y by P (x B , y o ) = 1 is easily shown to belong to M i and to attain the desired equality. Let us therefore consider the case that Π X (B) < 1. Let x be a modal point of the marginal distribution π X . Note that x ∈ B so x = x B . As π Y is unimodal with unique mode y o , we must have that π X,Y (x , y o ) = 1. We also infer from Lemma 3 that π X,Y (x B , y o ) = π X (x B ). Consider the probability measure P uniquely defined on the power set of X × Y by P (x B , y o ) = π X,Y (x B , y o ) and
We proceed to show that P ∈ M i . Observe that
, so Lemma 4 tells us that P satisfies (CI 1 ) if and
, which holds by construction. Next, observe that
and P (X × {y}) = 0 for every y ∈ Y \ {y o }, we may infer from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 2 ). Since moreover π Y (y o ) = 1 we immediately infer from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 3 ) as well. We may therefore indeed conclude that P ∈ M i . It is now obvious that
so the second condition of Theorem 2 is satisfied.
We may summarise these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. The normal joint distribution π X,Y is coherent under independence if and only if it satisfies (NC) and for all
In checking whether the conditions of this theorem are verified, the following lemma will allow us to proceed somewhat faster.
Lemma 9. Assume that the normal joint distribution π X,Y satisfies condition (NC)
and let (x, y) be an element of X × Y such that one of the following conditions is satisfied:
3. 0 < π X,Y (x, y) and max{π X (x), π Y (y)} < 1, and there are x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that π X,Y (x , y) = π Y (y), π X,Y (x, y ) = π X (x) and π X,Y (x , y ) = 1.
Then there is a P in M i such that P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y).
Proof. Assume that the first condition is satisfied. We know from the first part of Theorem 2 that M i = ∅. It follows from condition (CI 1 ) and π X,Y (x, y) = 0 that
Next, if the second condition holds, we may assume without loss of generality that
, consider the (degenerate) probability measure defined on the power set of X × Y by P (x, y) = 1 = π X,Y (x, y). It is easily verified that
Consider the probability measure P uniquely defined on the power set of X × Y by P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y) and P (x , y) = 1 − π X,Y (x, y). It remains to be shown that P ∈ M i . First of all, recall that π X,Y (x, y) ≤ π X,Y (x , y) = 1, so to prove that P satisfies (CI 1 ), Lemma 4 tells us that we need only verify that P (x, y) ≤ π X,Y (x, y), which holds by construction. Next, observe that π X (x) ≤ π X (x ) = 1
and that P (X × {v}) > 0 only if v = y, so in order to verify that P satisfies (CI 2 ),
Lemma 4 tells us that we need only verify that P (x, y)/P (X × {y}) ≤ π X (x), or equivalently, π X,Y (x, y)/1 ≤ π X (x), which holds trivially. Finally, since P (u, v) > 0 only if v = y, and since π Y (y) = 1, we infer from Lemma 4 that P also satisfies (CI 3 ),
To conclude the proof, let us assume that the third condition holds. Lemma 3 then tells us that π X,Y (x, y) < π X (x)π Y (y). Consequently, there is some α ∈ (0, 1) such that π X,Y (x, y) = απ X (x)π Y (y). It also follows from the assumption that π X (x ) = π Y (y ) = 1 and therefore x = x and y = y. We now define the (finitely) additive set function P on the power set of X × Y by:
and P (u, v) = 0 for all other (u, v) ∈ X ×Y. We show that P is a probability. It is clear that P (x, y) + P (x, y ) + P (x , y) + P (x , y ) = 1, so it remains to be shown that all these terms are non-negative. First of all, it is obvious that P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y) ≥ 0.
Moreover,
and from the symmetry, we infer that also P (x, y ) ≥ 0. Finally, since
where the inequality follows from (NC), we see that
The proof is complete if we can show that P ∈ M i .
We use Lemma 4. We may assume without loss of generality that
where the inequality follows from (NC). We may then conclude from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 1 ). Next, observe that π X (x) < π X (x ) = 1,
For every v ∈ Y different from y and y , we have that P (X × {v}) = 0, so we may conclude from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 2 ). The proof that P satisfies (CI 3 ) is completely symmetrical. 
Proof. It is enough to check that the condition is sufficient. Assume therefore that (NC)
holds. It follows from Theorem 8 that π X,Y is coherent under epistemic independence if and only if for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y there is some P ∈ M i such that P (x, y) =
. This is what we now set out to prove. Let us assume without loss of generality that π Y is unimodal with unique mode y o , and let (x, y) be an arbitrary element of X × Y. Lemma 9 (conditions 1 and 2) tells us that we may assume that
We show that in this case condition 3 of Lemma 9 holds because of the unimodality of π Y , so that there is nothing left to prove. Indeed, there is some x ∈ X such that π Y (y) = π X,Y (x , y), whence we deduce that π X (x ) = 1 and therefore x = x, using Lemma 3. Similarly, there is some What we have in particular proven is that given two marginal possibility distributions π X and π Y , at least one of which is unimodal, the largest independent product possibility distribution that is coherent, is given by
where T is the binary operator T :
for all α and β in [0, 1]. The operator T is non-decreasing in both arguments, and has unit 1 and zero 0, so it is a so-called triangular seminorm. It is moreover continuous and commutative, but it is not a triangular norm, because it does not satisfy the associative property. To see this, take α = 1/4, β = 1/2 and γ = 3/4; then T (α, T (β, γ)) = 81/1540 < 9/124 = T (T (α, β), γ).
The general case
We now turn to the general case that both distributions π X and π Y may be plurimodal.
The first thing to note is that the result of the previous case cannot be extended. To see this, consider the following counterexample. 
where, of course, 0 ≤ β ≤ 3/10. Since (NC) holds trivially for x and y such that max{π X (x), π Y (y)} = 1, we see that the necessary condition (NC) for coherence under independence is satisfied provided that β ≤ T (1/2, 3/10) = 3/26. Assume that π X,Y is coherent under independence, which implies in particular that there is a P ∈ M i such that P (a 1 , b 1 ) = β, and which also implies that β ≤ 3/26. Assume in addition that β > 0, whence P ({a 1 } × Y) > 0 and P (X × {b 1 }) > 0. There is some
This implies that P (X × {b 2 }) > 0. Consequently, it follows from
We find in a completely similar (or symmetrical) way that
By combining these inequalities we find that
and if β > 1/9, or in other words, if
this contradicts the fact that P is a probability measure. We conclude that there can be no coherence for β > 1/9! This counterexample suggests a sufficient condition for independence and coherence in the general case.
Theorem 11. If the normal joint distribution
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y, then it is coherent under epistemic independence.
Proof. Since (NC) is in particular satisfied, Theorem 8 tells us that we only have to show that for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y there is some P ∈ M i such that P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y). We infer from Lemma 9 (conditions 1 and 2) that we may assume that 0 < π X,Y (x, y) and max{π X (x), π Y (y)} < 1. Then there are x ∈ X and y ∈ Y such that π X,Y (x , y) = π Y (y) and π X,Y (x, y ) = π X (x). It follows from the assumptions and Lemma 3 that π X (x ) = π Y (y ) = 1, whence also x = x and y = y. Lemma 9 (condition 3) tells us that we may assume that π X,Y (x , y ) < 1. Consequently, there are x = x in X and y = y in Y such that π X,Y (x , y ) = π X,Y (x , y ) = 1.
Note that π X (x ) = π Y (y ) = 1, so π X and π Y are in this case plurimodal, x = x and y = y. It also follows from the assumptions and Lemma 3 that there is some α ∈ (0, 1) such that π X,Y (x, y) = απ X (x)π Y (y). We can assume without loss of generality that π X (x) ≤ π Y (y). Let P be the probability measure uniquely defined on the power set of X × Y by P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y),
and P (x , y ) = 1 − α. (It is easy to see that all these terms are non-negative and add up to one.) It only remains to show that P ∈ M i . We use Lemma 4. Recall
Observe that P (x, y) = π X,Y (x, y) and that
and is therefore is dominated by π X,Y (x , y) = π Y (y) if and only if
which is implied by the hypothesis. We may therefore conclude from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 1 ). Note also that P (X × {y}) = απ Y (y) > 0, P (X × {y }) > 0 and P (X × {y }) = P (x , y ) > 0 and that P (X × {v}) = 0 for all other v ∈ Y. Since
and since it is easily verified that P (x, y )/P (X × {y }) ≤ π X (x) if and only if
which is implied by the hypothesis, we infer from Lemma 4 that P satisfies (CI 2 ).
Similarly, note that
and
we infer from Lemma 4 that P also satisfies (CI 3 ), so we may indeed conclude that
This theorem provides us with a sufficient condition for the coherence under epistemic independence of possibility measures. The condition is not necessary, however.
To see this, it is enough to consider the case that (NC) holds and one of the marginal distributions is unimodal, but where for some (x, y) ∈ X × Y,
Then we deduce from Theorem 10 that π X,Y is coherent under epistemic independence. Still, π X,Y does not satisfy the condition given by the last theorem. The condition is not necessary in the case that both marginals are plurimodal either, as the following counterexample shows. we suspect that in some cases it will be too informative to be adequately modelled by possibility measures, or within the context of possibility theory. This is illustrated by the fact that, as we have seen above, the greatest independent joint possibility measure T (Π X (A), Π Y (B)) can be appreciably smaller than the independent natural extension E(A × B) = Π X (A)Π Y (B) on products A × B: if we restrict ourselves to possibilistic models, we are obliged, in order to capture independence, to use products that may be significantly more precise than if we had used a more general approach, e.g., with coherent upper probabilities. This identifies a weakness in possibility theory.
